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Bruce Pardy* The Only Legitimate Rule: A Reply to
MacLean's Critique of Ecolawgic
Is autonomy "natural"? In Ecolawgic: The Logic of Ecosystems and the Rule of Law,
I argue that a legal system of intrinsic neutrality is one over which no political office
or branch of government has control and in which individuals have the autonomy
to pursue their own interests. In 'Autonomy in the Anthropocene," the preceding
article in this issue, Jason MacLean challenges the thesis of Ecolawgic. MacLean
argues that autonomy is not a feature of neutral legal systems but a product of
cultural norms and regulation. He maintains that Ecolawgic's prescription provides
neither optimal economic outcomes nor effective environmental protection. The
purpose of this article is to reply to MacLean's critique and to argue that there is
only one legitimate rule to govern legal relations between competent adults.
L'autonomie est-elle un phdnomene < naturel >? Dans Ecolawgic: The Logic
of Ecosystems and the Rule of Law, javance qu'un systeme juridique de
neutralit6 intrinseque est un systeme juridique sur lequel aucune fonction
politique ni aucune branche de gouvernement n'exerce de contrle et dans
lequel les particuliers ont Iautonomie de poursuivre leurs propres intbr~ts. Dans
<< Autonomy in the Anthropocene, > article precedent de la prdsente edition,
Jason MacLean conteste la these d'Ecolawgic. 11 allegue que I'autonomie nest
pas une caractbristique d'un systeme juridique mais plutdt un produit des normes
culturelles et de la rdglementation. 11 soutient que la prescription d'Ecolawgic
n'amene ni des rdsultats 6conomiques optimaux ni une protection efficace de
'environnement. Dans cet article, Iauteur entend rdpondre a la critique de Jason
MacLean et faire valoir le point qu'il n'existe qu'une regle Idgitime pour rdgir les
rapports juridiques entre adultes compdtents.
* Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston.
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Conclusion: Ecosystems or markets all the way down
Introduction
In Ecolawgic: The Logic ofEcosystems and the Rule ofLaw, I argue that
law should reflect the logic of ecosystems and markets. A legal system
of intrinsic neutrality is one over which no political office or branch of
government has control, and in which individuals are at liberty to pursue
their own interests. "Such a system treats its participants dispassionately
and equally, subjecting all to the same rules. Systems do not play
favourites."2 I maintain that the law of modern administrative welfare
states, and in particular contemporary environmental law, is not a neutral
system but instrumentalist and incoherent.
In "Autonomy in the Anthropocene: Libertarianism, Liberalism,
and the Legal Theory of Environmental Regulation,"3 Jason MacLean
challenges the thesis of Ecolawgic. MacLean argues that autonomy is
not a feature of neutral legal systems but a product of cultural norms and
1. (Kingston, Ont: Fifth Forum Press, 2015) [Ecolawgic]. A copy in PDF may be downloaded at no
charge at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2663505>.
2. Ibid at 37.
3. The preceding article in this issue of the Dalhousie Law Journal [MacLean].
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regulation. He maintains that Ecolawgic's prescription provides neither
optimal economic outcomes nor effective environmental protection.4
The purpose of this piece is to reply to MacLean's analysis and
to further elucidate the implications of Ecolawgic. Before I address
MacLean's objections, I will turn first to a matter on which we appear to
agree.
I. Turtles all the way down
In Rapanos v United States, Justice Antonin Scalia offered a version of
the traditional tale of how the Earth is carried on the backs of animals. In
this version of the story,
an Eastern guru affirms that the earth is supported on the back of a tiger.
When asked what supports the tiger, he says it stands upon an elephant;
and when asked what supports the elephant he says it is a giant turtle.
When asked, finally, what supports the giant turtle, he is briefly taken
aback, but quickly replies "Ah, after that it is turtles all the way down."
Arguments about legal norms and standards are arguments about
legitimacy. In ecosystems, there are no legal norms or standards.
Everybody eats somebody else. In evolutionary terms, success means
surviving to reproduce. No other rules govern behaviour. The law of the
jungle does not require legitimacy. In ecosystems, we might say, anything
goes and might is right.
In human societies, does might make right? Legal philosophers seek
to legitimize laws on other grounds. They say that laws are inherently
right not when they are enacted and enforced by the powerful but when
they reflect some other value that has inherent validity. For some,
legitimacy derives from the law's consistency with moral standards. For
others, legitimacy depends upon the law's effectiveness at achieving
desirable social outcomes, such as aggregate economic welfare, equality,
environmental protection or other objectives.
4. Despite his objections, MacLean sifts through the hard-edged positions in Ecolawgic to find
common ground where he can. With an intellectual openness and generosity of spirit, he suggests
that there are ideas in Ecolawgic that can be applied within the prevailing paradigm of environmental
managerialism and executive discretion His gentle condemnation reflects the best traditions of
pragmatic legal pluralism, but it obscures the incompatibility between Ecolawgic and the modem
administrative welfare state. One of Ecolawgic's targets is legal instrumentalism, the use of law as
a tool in the pursuit of social and political goals. Its argument is not that technocratic supervision of
society should be improved but rather condemned as incoherent, ad-hoc and inconsistent with the rule
of law.
5. Rapanos v United States, 126 S Ct 2208 (2006) at 2233.
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In Ecolawgic, I argue that these values are merely competing
preferences. They are turtles all the way down. The proposition that the
law should reflect that which is good, moral, or desirable is a fiction.
Good, moral and desirable are matters about which people disagree and
no view can be proven to be correct. In a pluralistic society, entrenching
a particular view about what is good does not reflect the predilections
of all members of the community to which it is applied. Law becomes
a vacuum that can be filled by whatever interest gains access to state
power to achieve subjective preferences.6
One need not be a moral relativist or subjectivist to make this objection.
It is one thing to believe in a moral code, and quite another to impose that
code on other people who do not agree. Moral reasoning is harmless if it
is personal, theoretical and unenforced. People can decide for themselves
if they agree, and if not, no sanctions follow. In contrast, what is at stake
in legal theories of moral justification is not truth but power. The search is
for standards with which to coerce.' If those standards cannot be proven to
be objectively valid, they are mere preferences and opinions, and have no
legitimacy as a basis for coercive legal norms.
This claim, of course, is not new or novel.8 For example, Richard
Posner dismisses the work of legal philosophers when he writes:
[I]t would be a disaster if moral theorists succeeded in their implied aim
of imposing a uniform morality on society. Of course, these theorists,
in our society anyway, do not agree on what that morality should be.'
... [E]ven if I am wrong in thinking that there are no interesting moral
universals, they would be unusable in moral argument if we could not
determine what they are.'
6. Ecolawgic, supra note 1 at 109.
7. If you wish to develop legal norms with which I am not required to comply, that is no concern of
mine.
8. "Even if one concedes that there are objective answers to the questions about the identification
of the law, one could still maintain that objectivity about the content of the law is highly suspect. We
may know for sure what the law is on a given issue, but whether it is right or wrong is something that
we cannot objectively determine. Now, is this just the age-old worry about the objectivity of moral
values? Not necessarily. There is a jurisprudential issue that has to be settled first. The issue is whether
legal norms' appraisals in terms of right or wrong necessarily reduce to moral worth Can we simply
avoid this question just by talking about the objectivity ofvalues in general? After all, legal discourse,
even if not reducible to moral values, is part of a larger frame of evaluative discourse in general; why
not, then, simply discuss the objectivity of values?" Andrei Marmor, "An Essay on the Objectivity of
Law" in Brian Bix, ed, Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)
3 at 15 (reference omitted).
9. Richard Posner, "The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory" (1998) 111 Harv L Rev 1637 at
1642.
10. Ibid at 1645.
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MacLean appears to agree that instrumentalist policy choices and moral
reasoning are, indeed, turtles all the way down. He suggests that the attempt
to develop abstract principles "necessarily proceeds from unexamined
presumptions about what is good, just, normal, and natural."" He invokes
the view of Stanley Fish that "neutral" principles reflect unacknowledged
values and historical circumstances.1 2
II. Turtles all the way down, except for my turtle at the bottom
It is easy to be blind to one's own preferences. While Posner dismisses
legal theory as a source of universal morality, he has notoriously argued
that legal rules and judgments should seek to achieve economic efficiency
and maximize aggregate welfare.13 However, economic efficiency and
aggregate welfare are preferences too. In so doing, he assumes that his
own normative preferences have inherent validity and ignores the value
judgments inherent in them.
MacLean accuses me of an equivalent error, and further below I
will accuse him likewise. In Ecolawgic, after I dismiss natural law and
instrumentalist policy goals as inherently subjective and illegitimate,
I then argue that the law should reflect the immutable features of
ecosystems and markets, in which individuals are independent from the
moral and instrumentalist preferences of their governments. In doing so,
says MacLean, I am simply substituting my own version of good, moral
or desirable. "[I]ndividual autonomy is not natural but rather historically
contingent and normative."" In other words, MacLean says, autonomy is
a turtle too.
III. Two versions ofautonomy
1. Autonomy in ecosystems
An ecosystem is not a thing. It does not exist as a concrete entity.
"Ecosystem" is a label for the dynamics that result when organisms
interact with each other and their environment. Those dynamics occur in
infinite variation, but always reflect the same logic:
[C]ompetition for scarce resources leads to natural selection, where
those organisms better adapted to ecosystem conditions survive and
reproduce, leading to evolutionary change. All participants are equally
subject to their forces; systems do not play favourites.
11. MacLean, supra note 3 at 228.
12. Stanley Fish The Trouble With Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) at 6,
quoted by MacLean, ibid.
13. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, 7th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2007).
14. MacLean, supra note 3 at 282.
15. Ecolawgic, supra note 1 at 18 [references omitted].
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In ecosystems, the use of the word "autonomy" does not mean legally
enforced liberty but the reverse: no externally imposed rules govern
behaviour. In ecosystems unmanaged by people, organisms can succeed or
fail, live or die, as their genetically determined physiology and behaviour
allow. Every life feeds on the death of others, whether animal or plant,
and those better adapted to their circumstances survive to reproduce.
Organisms can do anything that their genes dictate, and their success or
failure is the consequence that fuels evolution.
The behaviour and survival of individuals are the engines of natural
selection. Individuals survive to reproduce or they die. Their aggregate
success or failure determines the fate of species, but species do not
compete collectively. Genetic mutation occurs within individual offspring
and individual behaviour determines survival or death.16 When an antelope
is chased by a lion and plunges into a river to escape, that action allows
the antelope to survive and thus to reproduce. The offspring may carry a
genetic disposition to run into water when chased by predators. There are
no committees of either antelopes or humans deciding how antelopes will
behave. Autonomy in ecosystems is not a human creation. It is not based
upon human history or culture and is not a human preference.
2. Autonomy in markets
A market is not a thing either. Nor is it a place. Markets, like ecosystems,
do not exist as concrete entities. "Market" is a label for the dynamics that
result when people exchange with each other. Bargains may be commercial
in nature, where things are bought and sold, but they also occur in other
facets of life. For example, in Ecolawgic I suggested that marriage is a
kind of exchange that is made when people perceive themselves better off
to enter into the bargain than ot to.
MacLean says my claim that markets, like ecosystems, arise
spontaneously is manifestly inaccurate." He cites the Western Carbon cap-
and-trade initiative as a market created by government, and thus concludes
that markets are created by governments. This logic is faulty. That one
can find a market created by a state does not lead to the conclusion that
16. "To say that organisms compete for scarce resources is not to suggest that they are always
engaged in direct physical struggle. Conflict between organisms can indeed be direct, violent and
deadly, such as when predators consume prey. However, there are many ways to compete, and
competition in ecosystems encompasses a diverse array of adaptations and strategies. Survival does
not necessarily depend on being the largest, fastest or most ferocious, but on being effectively adapted
to the requirements of the environment in which the organism lives. Relationships between organisms
cover the spectrum between conflict and coexistence: predation, parasitism, symbiosis, mutual
dependence and cooperation." Ecolawgic, supra note 1 at 18-19 (references omitted).
17. MacLean, supra note 3 at 295.
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markets must be created by states. Whether governments can indeed
create" or facilitate markets does not answer the question whether markets
anse without hem.
MacLean says that state initiatives make modem economies complex.
I do not doubt that laws and regulations facilitate and affect modem
economies in many ways. Money, credit, executory contracts and so on
no doubt affect the form of commercial transactions. States may create
the infrastructure within which market transactions occur. As I said in
Ecolawgic, "Laws and governments can make markets more stable and
efficient, such as by enforcing contracts and creating a supply of money,
but they create neither the activity of trading nor the market dynamics that
the transactions create."1 9 These matters do not speak to the question of
whether people transact without governments. MacLean conceives of a
market as something that is created first within which people then transact.
However, a market is not a place or a legal structure but the dynamics of a
collection of transactions. It does not exist before or independently of the
transactions within it. The transactions make the market. Transactions are
not created by governments but by the parties who enter into them.
Modem commercial markets reflect formalized systems of commerce.
However, to see that markets arise spontaneously, imagine a small
population of isolated people. To get what they want, they will trade with
each other. They may barter, use a form of money or some other store of
value. Their self-interest will motivate them to exchange things for other
things, or for services from other people.
A hunter kills a deer. A woodworker makes a set of chairs. The hunter
already has meat for the winter, and the woodworker already has chairs
in her house. The result: a trade.20
In a different vein, consider the "market" for friends, tennis partners, or
mates. Like any other scarce good, partners are subject to the dynamics
of supply and demand. When people enter into a romantic relationship,
an exchange takes place.2 1 Romantic relationships are not commercial
transactions but they are bargains in which people give things in exchange
18. I will leave aside the question whether a cap-and-trade system really deserves to be called a
market rather than a tax.
19. Ecolawgic, supra note 1 at 22.
20. Ibid at 21.
21. Show me unconditional love between two rational adults who have only recently met, and I will
show you two people who are lying either to you or to themselves.
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for what they get back.2 2 The features and benefits that are exchanged
(looks, personality, status, wealth, stability, belonging, security, emotional
support and so on) are no less subject to supply and demand than the other
myriad wants that people seek to satisfy in commercial transactions. Like
markets for goods, the market for mates does not depend upon the state.
People transact whether they are facilitated by governments or not. The
evidence is everywhere. If it were not so, human beings would not have
bartered long before there were governments to create money and enforce
contracts.2 3 During Prohibition, no alcohol would have been produced and
sold.2 4 Citizens of the Soviet Union would not have exchanged goods.2 5
Today there would be no drug trade, no black market and no smuggling.
Cigarettes would not be used as currency inside jails.2 6 People would not
date, hold garage sales or trade hockey cards. There would be no Bitcoin
or barter. Try prohibiting people from transacting and see that they will
transact anyway. They will do so because they perceive themselves as
better off Sometimes the benefit is concrete and sometimes it is ethereal.
The perception of benefit is personal and subjective.
Ecosystems and markets share many features2 7 but they differ in one
important respect. Violence plays an important role in ecosystems but is
not a part of voluntary market exchange. Ecosystems are arenas for mortal
22. For a taste of the literature in this area, see Gilles Saint-Paul, "Genes, Legitimacy and Hypergamy:
Another Look at the Economics of Marriage" (2009) IZADiscussion Paper No 4456, online: < https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1489279>.
23. See, e.g., Peter Temin, "Mediterranean Trade in Biblical Times" (2003) MIT Department of
Economics Working Paper No 03-12, online: <https://papers.ssrncom/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=386960>.
24. Clark Warburton, The Economic Results ofProhibition (New York: Columbia University Press,
1932).
25. "While the Soviet Union's legislators and theorists ponder the vistas of a revolutionary economic-
reform program, the people of this country live like hunter-gatherers in a real-world economy that is
half desert, half medieval bazaar. The official structures of the Bolshevik experiment are collapsing
with such finality, the state-run shops are so barren, that nearly everyone now must participate in
the immense 'shadow economy' of speculation and petty bribery, barter deals and black-marketeers.
President Mikhail Gorbachev has proposed sweeping economic change to a form of market economy
-a measure the Supreme Soviet is scheduled to vote on Monday. But that's the future; for today, life
for the average Soviet citizen is a struggle for survival. The demands of the 'shadow economy' trace a
Soviet lifetime. A child comes into the world with the mother paying a 200-ruble bribe to the maternity
nurse for a sterile needle and an anesthetic. When a Soviet citizen dies, relatives are overcome not only
with grief but with the knowledge that they must pay thousands of rubles in bribes to the mortician, the
coffin maker and the gravedigger." David Remnick, "Soviet Union's 'Shadow Economy'-Bribery,
Barter, Black-Market Deals are the Facts of Life," Washington Post (22 September 1990).
26. Keri Blakinger,"Ramen is surpassing cigarettes as the hottest prison currency," New York Daily
News (23 August 2016).
27. Ecolawgic, supra note 1 at 25-35.
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combat.2 8 Lions eat antelopes if they can catch them. Nothing prevents
taking a dead antelope from a lion except the lion's response. There
are no restrictions on survival strategies, and organisms do not respect
the interests, habitats or lives of other organisms. Markets, in contrast,
proceed upon the judgment of the transacting parties that they are better
off to trade than to fight. The hunter did not shoot the woodworker to get
chairs, and the woodworker traded for meat instead of stealing it. They
chose to trade because it made them better off than fighting. The reasons
are their own. Perhaps they were friends, colleagues or allies. Perhaps
they believed that harming other people is wrong. Perhaps they hoped to
have an ongoing trading relationship. Perhaps fighting carried risks that
were too high and they feared injury or retribution. Perhaps trading was
less work than fighting. For whatever reason, they chose to trade. This
choice is not universal. People have traded throughout human history, but
they have also fought. I do not maintain that trading is any more "natural"
or inbred than fighting, but neither is it is less so. When people choose to
fight, they are no longer part of a market. Markets are like ecosystems with
the violence removed.2 9 They are the kinder, gentler version of ecosystems.
In both ecosystems and markets, participants are "autonomous"
but in different respects. In ecosystems, organisms follow their genetic
dispositions. Ifthey are adapted to eat antelopes, they are free to catch them
if they can. If they are fleet-footed antelopes, they are free to run away. But
antelopes have no right not to be caught and eaten. In markets, human
beings pursue their interests without coercion. They decide to buy or sell
which goods or services and at what quantity and price. Taking goods
by force is not a market transaction. Markets arise spontaneously when
people voluntarily agree to trade without the threat of force and to honour
bargains. No doubt this cooperation can be precarious because it depends
28. "The forest, as usual, is quiet apart from the muted sounds of rustling leaves, buzzing insects,
and a few chirping birds. Suddenly, pandemonium breaks out as three chimpanzees tear through the
trees high above the forest floor, leaping spectacularly from branch to branch, hair bristling, screaming
wildly as they chase a group of colobus monkeys at breakneck speed. In less than a minute, an
experienced older chimp makes a magnificent jump, catches a terrified monkey that was heading his
way, and dashes its brains out against a tree. The hunt is over as suddenly as it started. As the victor
rips his prey into pieces and starts to consume the flesh, other chimps hoot with excitement. Any
humans watching, however, are likely to be shocked. Observing chimps can be disturbing, not just
because of the violence, but also because we prefer to think of them as gentle, intelligent cousins.
Sometimes they seem mirrors of our better selves, but when hunting, chimps reflect humanity's darker
tendencies in their craving for flesh, their capacity for violence, and even their lethal use of teamwork
and strategy." Daniel Lieberman, The Story ofthe Human Body: Evolution, Health and Disease (New
York: Pantheon Books, 2013) at 25-26.
29. "Serious sport... is war minus the shooting." George Orwell, "The Sporting Spirit" in Shooting
an Elephant and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1945) at 153. Markets are
ecosystems minus the violence.
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on continuing restraint from both parties and their ongoing judgment that
they are better off with voluntary trades in the absence of coercion. Laws
can protect the voluntariness of market transactions by prohibiting the use
of force. In essence, both groups of participants are autonomous within the
rules of the system in which they are participating.
IV. MacLean turtles
Before I address MacLean's claim that the neutral path I describe in
Ecolawgic is itself a turtle, I will first get MacLean's own turtles out of
the way.
1. Beneficial markets, just outcomes, market failures
MacLean's first turtle is a preference for particular kinds of economic
results. He dismisses the appropriateness of "free markets" because he
perceives them to be inferior vehicles to a just world. He suggests that
the notion of an unencumbered market obscures government's ability to
regulate markets to achieve desirable distributions and optimal results.30
He cites a propensity for "catastrophic market failures"3 1 and the failure of
markets to deliver their "core promise of increasing economic growth." 32
If I were a market economist, I would respond to these claims by
challenging his facts and conclusions. I would point out that the markets
he is assessing are hardly "free" but instead heavily regulated. Truly
competitive markets are rare in the real world. Whether catastrophic
market failures arise as a result of not enough or too much regulation is a
matter of dispute. For example, research as attributed the 2008 mortgage
crisis in the United States in part to regulation that incentivized banks
to extend loans to poorly qualified buyers.3 3 I would also cite numerous
economic studies that show that unregulated markets do indeed maximize
the size of the economic pie.34 Even when the fortunes of those at the top
and the bottom diverge, a rising tide lifts all boats. If I were an economist,
I would advocate for free markets because of the benefits they bring.
However, I am neither an economist nor an instrumentalist. Unlike
many economists, my rationale for markets is not the benefits that they
provide. Markets do not have a purpose. They are merely the dynamics of a
collection of voluntary transactions. Whatever results they produce is what
30. MacLean, supra note 3 at 297.
31. Ibidat299.
32. Ibid.
33. For example, see Sumit Agarwal et al, "Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to
Risky Lending?" (2012) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 18609, online:
<http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8609>.
34. I will not attempt to resolve this dispute about economic theory in a few lines of a law review
article.
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you get. Those results may be advantageous or detrimental to the financial
interests of certain players but they are not incorrect. "Catastrophic market
failure" is a label for an outcome that you do not like. For example, over
time in a tight market with limited supply, buyers may pay increasingly
higher prices for homes and create a bubble that eventually bursts when
prices fall precipitously. Homeowners then may hold property that is worth
less than the mortgage debt hey owe. That may be a bad outcome for
many of the people but it is not a market failure. It is the systemic result of
many transactions for homes over a period of time. Prices go up and down,
sometimes gradually and sometimes suddenly. The supply of housing
changes and so does demand, sometimes in lockstep and sometimes in
opposite directions. Interest rates and inflation reflect economic conditions.
MacLean wants markets that are stable, growing modestly and producing
economic gains across a broad social spectrum, but that is not always the
state that they are in. His interest in "distributive consequences and the
justice of resulting outcomes" is a subjective preference for a social order
in which economic gains are distributed in accordance with a particular set
of ideological sensibilities. Markets reflect aggregate results of multiple
transactions, and each of those transactions expresses the individual
choices of their participants. The aggregate results are what they are. A
desire to fashion other results is just a preference.
2. Environmental management
MacLean's other turtle is a preference for a system of environmental
management in which decisions can be made one situation at a time, so
that regulators can weigh costs and benefits and pursue indeterminate
and variable policy objectives.3 5 Such objectives are the height of
discretionary value judgments.3 6 The preferences embedded in such
decisions are rarely identified or acknowledged much less justified. As I
write in Ecolawgic, modem environmental management is the archetype
of instrumentalist governance.3 7 MacLean asserts that environmental
law must be indeterminate and discretionary but does not provide any
legitimate reasons why it must be so.
35. MacLean, supra note 3 at 305.
36. MacLean complains that inEcolawgic I do not address political rent-seeking (ibid at 308 note
166). Political rent-seeking, also known as regulatory capture, occurs when companies influence
regulatory action in their favour. Discretionary regulatory action makes regulatory capture possible.
In a system where the state does not have the role of making discretionary value judgments, there is
nothing to capture. Where a legal system treats all participants equally, subjecting all to the same rules,
there is no opportunity for regulatory capture and no reason to pursue it.
37. Ecolawgic, supra note 1 at 77.
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V. Only two choices, only one legitimate rule
There are only two models for legal governance and only one legitimate
rule. The logic is as follows:
1. In the wild, organisms compete for scarce resources. Those organisms
better adapted to conditions urvive and reproduce. Their interactions
constitute ecosystems. No legal rules govern behaviour and might is
right.
2. Human beings trade spontaneously. Parties enter into transactions
when they perceive themselves as better off to trade than to fight. Their
transactions constitute markets.
3. Moral values and policy goals are preferences whose inherent validity
cannot be established. They are turtles all the way down. Therefore
laws based upon those preferences lack legitimacy.
4. When governments use might to impose laws and policies that are
illegitimate, they unintentionally imitate ecosystems, where might is
right. Political constituencies use whatever means necessary to impose
their preferences, and their opponents use whatever means necessary
to resist. They are "autonomous" in the ecosystem sense: there are no
inherently valid restrictions on behaviour. The result is a social order
of division and conflict.
5. The alternative is to model human governance on the other system that
exists independently of state preference: markets. Ifthe model for human
governance is markets, interactions between people are voluntary.
People are "autonomous" in the market sense: they may pursue their
own interests without coercion. Instead of imposing illegitimate rules
and policies, the state uses force only to prohibit people from imposing
force on each other. A plethora of sub-rules follow as corollaries of the
rule against coercion: property, consent, criminal offences that punish
violence and so on.
6. There is no third choice. Coercion is not right or wrong depending upon
the goals being pursued since those goals are merely preferences. Their
advocates cannot establish t at their goals have inherent validity to
those who do not agree. Therefore, giving priority to those objectives is
to assert hat might is right. If might is right, we are back to ecosystems,
where any and all actions are legitimate.
7. If might is right, anything goes, and the model is ecosystems. If might
is not right, force is prohibited, and the model is markets. Choose one
and all else follows.
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VI. The only legitimate rule and the other rules that follow
If the model is markets, other substantive rules follow as corollaries of
the rule that force between people is prohibited. I will not here attempt
to exhaustively identify the legal regime that results3 8 but merely provide
some examples of rules that necessarily arise if people are autonomous
in the market sense. For what this kind of autonomy might mean in the
context of environmental protection and market competitiveness, I refer
you to the pages of Ecolawgic.3 9
When I claim that a prohibition on force is the only legitimate rule,
I mean the only substantive rule to govern relations between competent
adults. No doubt the administration of a legal system, even a minimalist
one, would require other kinds of laws to function. Constitutional rules,
court administration, the conduct of elections and procedures to bring legal
proceedings are a few of the other categories that would be necessary in
order to give effect to the general rule.
1. Property
MacLean maintains that property is a product of history and law." He
quotes Bentham, who wrote, "Property and law are born together, and
die together. Before laws were made, there was no property; take away
laws, and property ceases."" No doubt the state of property in the law as
it presently exists is indeed a product of history and legal evolution. But if
the model is markets, the concept of property must also exist as a matter
of logic. If force between people is prohibited then property is inevitable.
A monkey has a banana. If he is lucky, he will eat the banana before
a bigger monkey takes it away. The jungle has no prohibitions on the use
of force, so the monkey with the banana holds it for only as long as he
can resist the encroachments of other hungry beasts. The monkey has a
banana but he has no property. The story changes if the monkey is a person
and coercion is prohibited. Taking the banana by force then constitutes a
38. I observe inEcolawgic that this rule happens to be consistent with much of the common law. "The
right to personal autonomy has a long and rich history in common law jurisdictions. Self-ownership is
the conceptual foundation of negative legal rights that are found at the core of the common law system.
Many existing common law causes of action reflect the principle of autonomy and self-ownership,
including tort causes of action in battery, false imprisonment, trespass, nuisance and negligence; the
rules of contract; rights of due process in criminal law; and so on" Ecolawgic, supra note 1 at 55.
However, the legitimacy of the rule is not based upon its status in the common law.
39. Perhaps it will also feature in a future part of this dialogue.
40. MacLean, supra note 3 at 296.
41. Jeremy Bentham, Theory ofLegislation (Boston: Weeks, Jordan & Company, 1840), quoted in
Joseph William Singer, No Freedom Without Regulation: The Hidden Lessons of the Subprime Crisis
(London: Yale University Press, 2015) at 15, quoted by MacLean, ibid.
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wrong. Therefore, the holder of the banana must have the right to exclude
others from it. That right is called property.
There is nothing particularly distinctive about property as a right,
except that it relates to things and land. The right not to be touched, for
example, operates much the same way as a property right, except that it
applies to one's own body instead of to a thing. Both provide the ability
to prevent others from imposing their will. The minutiae of property law
setting out tests for when property will be recognized and enforced may not
be self-evident and thus need to be worked out within each legal regime. I
do not maintain that he rule against perpetuities and statutory provisions
about intestate succession are "natural." These details are indeed products
of legal culture. But the existence of property rights must follow from a
general rule prohibiting coercion. If it does not, the general rule is not what
it purports to be.
When people trade, they recognize the property interest held by
the other party. It is that interest that they wish to obtain. When the
woodworker trades chairs for the hunter's meat, she trades "her" chairs
for "his" meat. The trade would not occur without a mutual understanding
of the possession that both hold over their respective stuff. Sometimes
those interests are recognized and protected by the law, which according
to Bentham created the property. However, since markets arise even where
no property is legally recognized, the notion of property must be prior to
the law. Above I gave examples of markets that have arisen where no legal
regime has protected property rights: prehistorical trade, alcohol sales
during Prohibition, black markets in the Soviet Union, the modem day
drug trade, smuggling of illicit goods, and the internal markets of prisons.
Since trading occurs even in the absence of an approving legal regime, the
notion of property must exist independently as well.
Property rights do not depend on the argument that they are inherently
good or morally righteous. They are not legitimate because they maximize
economic welfare, create incentives for self-interested stewardship or
democratize wealth. These are preferences. I do not seek to defend the
particularities of the law of property as it presently exists in any particular
jurisdiction. The case is merely that property is a feature of market systems
that arise independently of state design.
If the model for human governance is ecosystems, might is right,
anything goes and property is no more legitimate than any other notion. If
the model is markets, people are autonomous in the market sense. Markets
consist of trades and trades exchange property. Property protects people
from the force of other people and the state. If coercion is prohibited, then
property must exist.
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2. Consent
Autonomy in the market sense means to be able to pursue your own
interests and control your own choices without coercion. Consent is part
and parcel of autonomy. Without the ability to consent, no trades can
be made. Without trades, no markets exist. If one cannot consent to be
touched, to give up property, to make bargains, to mate, to arm wrestle, to
trade chairs for meat, to sell labour for money, and so on, then one is not
autonomous.
[C]onsent is not an example of a normative power at all. What is
fundamental to my autonomy rights is that I have control over who
interacts with my body in certain ways. It isn't accurate to think of the
right as a prohibition on boundary crossing to which we add a desirable
normative power of consent. The ability to consent is part and parcel of
what it is to be free; I get to decide, within various limits, what happens
to my body. And remember, I can always change my mind; I always
remain in control.4 2
An exchange can be pursuant to an agreement that is less formal than
a "contract" but the terms of the consent matter. They demarcate the
boundary between voluntary action and coercion. If two people agree to
wrestle but one punches the other in the face, the consent does not apply.
If two people agree to trade meat for chairs but one takes the other's horse
instead, the taking is coercive.
3. Other corollaries
If force is prohibited, then corollaries are laws that protect people from
having force imposed upon them. Laws apply the force of the state to
prevent or punish the application of force. A criminal law that prohibits
assault is an extension of the general rule. A tax to finance the police
department is legitimate if its purpose is to investigate and prosecute
violent crimes. Traffic laws prevent people from running each other over.
Civil liability compensates for physical injuries caused by the force of
others.
Illegitimate laws use state coercion to seek other ends such as enforcing
moral standards, pursuing social goals or saving people from themselves.
A criminal law that prohibits the use of drugs uses state force to prevent
an activity in which there is no coercion. A tax to fund the armed forces
42. Liam Murphy, "Private Law and Public Illusion, Part 1: Artificial Morality" (Frankfurt
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to protect the peace may be legitimate, but one to take wealth from Peter
to give to Paul is not. The legal regimes of modem administrative states
consist largely of instrumentalist laws and policies that are inconsistent
with the general rule, including tax laws, economic development programs,
bankruptcy, patent regimes, mandatory government-run pension plans and
MacLean's version of environmental regulation, in which each decision
turns on a political determination of the values to be applied.
Conclusion: Ecosystems or markets all the way down
It is either ecosystems or markets. Either might is right or it is not. If it
is, then human society is subject to the law of the jungle where people
are at liberty to fight like animals if they choose to do so. If it is not, then
human society is a marketplace where people may enter into transactions
voluntarily and the state may justifiably use force only to prevent or punish
the application of force.
There is no third choice. Some might insist that coercion is not
categorically wrong but that it can be right or wrong depending upon the
other goals to be pursued. Those goals are merely preferences. They are
turtles all the way down. I do not maintain that other rules will not be passed
and enforced using the established machinery of government but only that
they have no claim to legitimacy, any more than other rules that might
have been chosen instead. If force is used to pursue those preferences,
why would others not use force to resist? Such a choice results in a free-
for-all. If state force is right only because it cannot be resisted, that means
that might is right. The administrative welfare state prevails not because
it is justified morally or socially but because it has managed to secure a
monopoly on violence. The imposition of government preferences is an
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